Supreme Court says prosecutors went too far with Jan. 6 indictment

The Supreme Court judged on Friday that federal prosecutors improperly used an obstruction law to prosecute some members of the pro-Trump mob that stormed the Capitol on January 6, 2021.

The ruling could have consequences for the prosecution of hundreds of the more than 1,400 rioters charged with various offenses. They are alleged to have participated in the attempt to block the certification of the 2020 election results.

It could also have an effect on part of the federal case against former President Donald J. Trump, in which he is accused of plotting to overturn his 2020 loss at the ballot box. But the precise impact on those cases will only become clear when the courts review them in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling.

Prosecutors had argued that the law applied to attempts to obstruct an “official proceeding” – the joint session of Congress that took place on January 6, 2021 to certify the Electoral College results.

But Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., writing for the majority, interpreted the law narrowly, saying it applied only when the suspect’s actions compromised the integrity of physical evidence.

Lower courts will now apply this strict standard and it may lead them to dismiss charges against some suspects, although most suspects charged or convicted under the obstruction law also face other charges.

The vote was 6 to 3, but there were unusual alliances. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, a liberal, voted with the majority and wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Amy Coney Barrett, a conservative, wrote the dissent.

None of the rulings in the case addressed the charges against Trump, which are only partly based on the obstruction of justice act.

Judge Jackson said the Jan. 6 attack was an attack on democracy. But that was not the question before the court, she wrote.

“On January 6, 2021, an angry mob stormed the United States Capitol in an attempt to prevent Congress from fulfilling its constitutional duty to certify the electoral votes in the 2020 presidential election,” she wrote. “The peaceful transfer of power is a fundamental democratic norm, and those who attempted to disrupt it in this way have inflicted a deep wound on this nation.”

“But today’s case is not about the immorality of these acts,” she wrote. “Instead, the question before this court is much narrower: What is the scope of the specific crime that Congress has outlined?”

A broad interpretation of the law, Chief Justice Roberts wrote, “would criminalize a wide range of everyday conduct, sending activists and lobbyists to prison for decades.”

Most of the Jan. 6 suspects have not been charged under the obstruction law, which prosecutors have reserved for the most serious cases. In addition, most who are charged under this law also face other charges.

Federal prosecutors have downplayed the significance of the obstruction charge, saying it was an important but not essential part of their overall strategy to prosecute the 1,427 people charged so far in the attack on the Capitol. Of that number, 350 were charged under the portion of the law challenged in the case, the Justice Department said.

The biggest unknown is the fate of the 52 people convicted solely under the statute, without any other charges – 27 of whom are currently serving sentences in federal prison.

It is almost certain that those behind bars will immediately petition the court for their release. But investigators from the U.S. attorney’s office in Washington have continued to gather a huge amount of evidence, much of it in the form of new electronic communications from people who have already stood trial.

Law enforcement officials say that additional evidence could mean some of the Jan. 6 suspects also face charges on other charges. That could lead to new lawsuits.

For example, the defendant in the case before the judges, Joseph W. Fischer, faced six other charges.

Judge Jackson emphasized that a strict reading of the law did not necessarily mean that Mr. Fischer would prevail.

“It may well be that Fischer’s conduct, as alleged here, involved compromising (or attempting to compromise) the availability or integrity of items used during the January 6 proceeding,” she wrote. That question, she wrote, is for lower courts to decide.

The effect of the ruling in Mr. Fischer’s favor on Mr. Trump’s case could also be limited. Jack Smith, the special counsel who brought the federal election interference charge against the former president, has said that Mr. Trump’s conduct could be considered a crime even under a narrow interpretation of the obstruction law. Mr. Smith used the law in connection with Mr. Trump’s effort to create a slate of electors pledging to vote for him from states won by President Biden.

A brief passage in the majority opinion may support that view. Chief Justice Roberts wrote that it is possible to violate the obstruction law “by creating false evidence — rather than by altering incriminating evidence.”

That statement could very well refer to Trump’s attempts to create a list of fake voters.

Be that as it may, the former president faces two other unrelated charges under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.

In a separate case, the justices appear to rule Monday on whether Mr. Trump is immune from prosecution for the actions he took as president. The court’s ruling could raise irrelevant questions about whether the 2002 law covers his conduct.

The Supreme Court said that the purpose of the obstruction law, prompted by accounting fraud and the destruction of documents, was “to protect investors in public companies and restore confidence in the financial markets after the collapse of Enron Corporation.”

The question before the justices in Fischer v. United States, No. 23-5572, was whether the statute could be used to prosecute Mr. Fischer. a former police officer from Pennsylvania.

According to the government, Mr. Fischer sent text messages to his boss, the police chief of North Cornwall Township, Pennsylvania, about his plans for January 6. “It could get violent,” he said in one. In another, he wrote that “they should storm the capitol and drag all the Democrats out into the streets and get a trial.”

Prosecutors say videos showed Mr. Fischer shouting “Charge!” before pushing through the crowd and entering the Capitol about 3:24 p.m. on Jan. 6. He used a vulgar term to insult police officers, prosecutors said, and ran into a line of them. He was, the government’s order said, “forcibly removed approximately four minutes after entering.”

Mr Fischer’s lawyers, however, stressed that he had attended the meeting at the Ellipse but was not part of the initial attack.

“When the mob breached the Capitol, Mr. Fischer was in Maryland, not Washington, D.C.,” his lawyers wrote in their brief. “He returned after Congress had adjourned.”

“His previous Facebook posts about violence, when read in context, point to his belief that Antifa intended to disrupt the rally,” they continued. He had shouted “Attack!” in “obvious jest,” they added.

Prosecutors say Fischer obstructed an official proceeding by interfering with the certification of Biden’s election victory, in violation of a 2002 law aimed primarily at destroying evidence.

At least part of what the law sought to accomplish was to address a loophole in the federal criminal code: it was a crime to persuade others to destroy documents relevant to an investigation or official proceeding, but not to do so to do yourself. The law attempted to close that gap through a two-part provision. The first section made it a crime to corruptly alter, destroy, or conceal evidence to frustrate official proceedings. The second part, at issue in Mr. Fischer’s case, makes it a crime “otherwise” to corruptly obstruct, influence or impede an official proceeding.

The crux of the matter is at the pivot point from the first movement to the second. The ordinary meaning of “otherwise,” prosecutors said, is “in some other way.” That means, they said, that obstructing official proceedings does not have to mean destroying evidence. The second part, they say, is a broad collective term.

Mr. Fischer’s lawyers argued that the first part should inform and limit the second part — meaning that the obstruction of official proceedings must be linked to the destruction of evidence. They would read “otherwise” as “in like manner.”

Judge Jackson largely agreed. “There is no indication that Congress intended to enact a sweeping all-purpose obstruction statute,” she wrote.

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Barrett, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan, wrote that “Congress meant what it said.”

Glenn Thrush contributed to the reporting.