The US and Iran are fighting by proxies and cautiously avoiding each other
For all the fears about the outbreak of fighting in the Middle East that could draw the United States, Israel and Iran into direct combat, a curious feature of the conflict so far is the concern expressed – in both Tehran and Washington – spent on preventing their forces from coming into direct contact.
No one knows how long that will last, American and European diplomats and other officials say. But 100 days after the conflictis the assessment of most key players that Iran has incited its allies to cause problems for the US military and to put pressure on Israel and the West in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the Red Sea shipping lanes, while moving towards make every effort to avoid provoking a larger outburst.
It is the most delicate dance, full of subtle signals, attacks and feints, and undeniable action. The evidence of prudence is patchy, but ubiquitous.
While Tehran has done that has increased uranium production In recent weeks, the country has fallen dramatically, fueling fears that it is rapidly returning to the ability to manufacture several nuclear weapons, carefully staying just below the bomb fuel threshold. That is considered the red line that could lead to military action against the underground nuclear complexes.
When Israel attacked a suburb of Beirut on January 2 assassinate a Hamas leaderit carried out a very precise attack – the exact opposite of its campaign in Gaza – to prevent damage to nearby Hezbollah fighters. This allowed Israeli officials to make clear to Hezbollah, the Iranian-funded and armed terrorist group, that it had no interest in escalating the tit-for-tat attacks on Lebanon's southern border. (Six days later it killed Wissam Hassan Tawila commander of Hezbollah's most elite fighting force, the highest-ranking Hezbollah officer killed to date.)
And when the United States took out Houthi launch facilities, radar and weapons depots in Yemen just days ago, it struck at night, having clearly telegraphed its intentions, and avoided identifying the Houthi leadership behind the attacks on shipping in the target the Red Sea.
History is replete with failed attempts to keep American forces out of conflicts half the world lost control, as made clear by US entry into World War I in 1917, World War II in 1945, Korea in 1950 and Vietnam. gradually, in the 1960s. Accidents, assassinations, sinking ships and failed guidance systems can all undermine the most carefully planned strategy.
Yet in Ukraine, nearly two years later, a similar, unspoken set of restrictions has worked — somewhat to the surprise of even President Biden's closest aides. Early on, Mr. Biden ordered the military to do everything it could to support Ukraine — as long as U.S. forces did not directly attack Russian forces, whether on land, in the air or in the Black Sea. He also mandated that the Ukrainians not use US weapons against targets on Russian territory, although there are ongoing concerns about what will happen if a Russian missile hits a neighboring NATO country.
But Moscow and Washington had a nearly eighty-year history of Cold War signaling, which became cluttered with hotlines after the Cuban Missile Crisis. With Iran, there is neither the history nor the direct communication to guarantee that the controlled escalation remains, well, controlled.
In interviews, US intelligence officials say they continue to find that Iran is not interested in a broader war, even though it has encouraged it Houthi operations in the Red Sea. The whole goal of Iran's allies, they argue, is to find a way to hit Israel and the United States without unleashing the kind of war Tehran wants to avoid.
There is no direct evidence, they say, that senior Iranian leaders — neither the commander of the elite Quds Force nor the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei — ordered the recent Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea. But there is no doubt that Iran has supported the Houthi actions, and intelligence assessments show that Iranian officials believe the escalating conflict will increase costs for the West — without risking a broader war, U.S. officials said.
The White House has released information showing that Iran is supplying the Houthis with weapons, although the Houthis appear increasingly capable of making many of their own, including drones assembled from parts acquired from China and other suppliers. US officials believe Iranian ships and aircraft are providing targeting data. But U.S. spy agencies believe the Houthis are an independent organization and that Iran does not dictate their daily activities, U.S. officials said Friday.
“The question at the heart of all this is: to what extent are the actions of these proxies directed from Iran and to what extent are they local initiatives?” said Ryan C. Crocker, a legendary former diplomat who served as U.S. ambassador to countries including Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Mr. Crocker believes that Ayatollah Khamenei is even more effective than his predecessor, or the Iranian regime's shah, in projecting power through the region. But he said he was still grappling with how much Tehran directly controls.
“I still don't have a good answer,” he said in an interview. “You would expect that command and control would be greater at Hezbollah than at Hamas,” but he said he assumed all proxies “are at least directed by Tehran at the strategic level.”
What Iran's leadership cares about most, he argued, is “regime stability,” as the supreme leader is 84 years old and ill.
When President Donald J. Trump ordered the assassination of Major General Qassim Suleimanithe leader of the Quds Force, in 2020: “Iran's response to the assassination of its national hero was very measured,” noted Adnan Tabatabai, an expert on Middle East politics who focuses on relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
What followed, Mr. Tabatabai said, was “what I would call a serious deterrence crisis for Iran, as Israel, especially in the following two years, carried out the most humiliating operations on Iranian soil.” They include sabotage around the Natanz nuclear enrichment site and the murder from a distance of the scientist at the heart of the nuclear program.
But in the four years since, Iran has deepened and greatly improved its proxy forces, providing them with new generations of weapons, the ability to assemble their own weapons and more training.
Of all the proxy forces, it is perhaps the Houthis who feel more freedom to act under Iran's watch. They do not have deep roots in Tehran, as Hezbollah does. And they have proven an extraordinary ability to disrupt global trade. The Houthis have already caused Tesla and Volvo to temporarily experience parts shortages and are driving up energy prices.
As U.S. and British forces destroyed about 30 sites used by the Houthis in Yemen, Pentagon officials said Friday that the group retained about three-quarters of its ability to fire missiles and drones at ships transiting the Red Sea. It is unclear whether it will now be deterred – or whether it believes it has a duty to retaliate.
“Bombing the Yemeni resistance will not untie any knots in US strategy, just as it has not untied any knots in Vietnam and Afghanistan,” wrote Mohammad Imani, a conservative analyst, in a column for Fars News, a semi-official Iranian newspaper. organization, which calls the strikes 'a joke'.
The Iranians continue to engage the Houthis. On Sunday, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi praised them in a speech as “brave, powerful and fearless” for defending “the oppressed people of Palestine.” And he used the strike to try to encourage other countries to support the Palestinians, without making any commitments himself, declaring: “If the people of Islamic countries are given the opportunity, you will see armies ready to to be sent to Palestine.”
Diplomats in the Middle East say they are concerned that Israel's hardline government is investing far less in curbing the conflict than the Biden administration. Some theorize that they could see value in attacking Iranian allies and engaging the United States more directly.
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“Iran has tried to take the conflict abroad,” said Sanam Vakil, an Iran expert at Chatham House, a London-based research organization. “The red lines of Iran are the borders of Iran. Right now the country is very willing to gamble in the region, but not at home.”
Yet the strategy carries risks for Iran. Biden's ability to calibrate the U.S. response would become much more limited if U.S. soldiers or contractors were killed in a proxy attack — something that nearly happened in several recent incidents. If Americans are killed, pressure to direct attacks on Iran will increase sharply, officials acknowledge.
“For the Iranians, it has been very good for them so far, but it is getting to a point where it becomes very risky,” said Rainam al-Hamdani, a Yemeni analyst who has studied Iran-Houthi relations. He added: “One misstep by any of these proxies: if it strikes in the wrong place at the wrong time, we really risk a regional war.”
Leily Nikounazar reporting contributed.