Russia, learning from costly mistakes, shifts battlefield tactics

KRAMATORSK, Ukraine — The squad of soldiers had been out of their Ukrainian armored personnel carrier for only a few minutes when the treeline erupted in front of them in Russian gunfire. The twelve or so soldiers, sent to reinforce a trench, were pinned down for hours.

“I’ve never seen so much fire from so many positions,” one soldier said in a mission report obtained by The New York Times.

A soldier fighting for Ukraine was killed and nine wounded in the battle, which took place near the Ukrainian town of Bakhmut in March. Russian troops, the report said, showed a “high level of skill and equipment”.

The ambush was part of a patient, disciplined operation that contrasted with the disorderly Russian tactics that characterized much of the first year of the war, which began in February 2022. It was a deadly demonstration that the Russian military was learning from its mistakes and adapting. adapt to Ukrainian tactics, which had initially been grossly underestimated.

Russia gained ground early in the war with sheer firepower. Interviews with 17 Ukrainian soldiers, a Russian prisoner of war, officers, foreign fighters and Western officials, as well as a review of documents and videos, show that the Kremlin’s gains, especially in Bakhmut, in recent months are due in part to a series of adjustments.

For example, Russian armored columns no longer rush into areas where they can be quickly damaged or destroyed. Troops are more likely to use drones and sounding attacks – and sometimes just shouting – to find Ukrainian trenches before they strike. And the mercenary Wagner group has shown he can outrun Ukrainian defenders with a combination of improved tactics and available ranks.

As it begins its long-awaited counter-offensive, Ukraine is well armed, backed by improved communications technology and US and European weapons.

But Moscow’s troops have improved their defences, artillery coordination and air support, mounting a campaign that could look very different from the early days of the war. These improvements, Western officials say, will most likely make Russia a tougher opponent, especially as it fights defensively and uses its strengths on the battlefield. This defensive turn is a far cry from Russia’s original plan for a full-scale invasion and Ukrainian defeat.

To be sure, along a frontline of about 600 miles, Russia’s military capabilities remain uneven. Prisoners have become part of its operations and, despite their lack of training, have figured prominently in the battle for Bakhmut. The Kremlin’s increasing reliance on “kamikaze” drones, or air-dropped glide bombs, reflects both a shortage of ammunition and an innovative strategic shift.

“They are trying to find rear command posts of companies and brigades and destroy them from a great distance in order to disrupt communication between units as much as possible,” said Graf, a commander of a Ukrainian drone unit. Russia’s air force, largely castrated since the invasion, has adapted its tactics and munitions, including glide bombs, to attack Ukrainian troops without endangering their aircraft.

US officials acknowledge that Russian tactics have improved. But those officials believe, based on battlefield intelligence reports, that the success at Bakhmut was largely due to Wagner’s willingness to throw prisoners into battle, regardless of the cost in lives.

But the soldiers on the ground saw something else happen.

Soldiers fighting for Ukraine in Bakhmut described a battle that ended very differently from how it began. Prisoners were not so common. Instead, they said, Wagner’s professional fighters coordinated ground and artillery fire on Ukrainian positions, then quickly outflanked them using small teams.

For example, while Ukrainian territory shrank to a last few blocks, Russian troops flooded a Ukrainian-occupied building with artillery. Moments after they withdrew, Russian troops were inside.

“The Ukrainians just couldn’t keep up,” said a Foreign Legion soldier. To counter Russia’s strategy, Ukrainian forces wired buildings to detonate, detonating them as they retreated.

The March mission report shared with The Times alluded to this type of enemy: “Supposed to be the Wagner group,” the report read. “Evidence of being well-educated.”

“Used effective fire and maneuver,” it continued, describing “the best-equipped Russian soldiers.”

But proficiency in one area or on one mission has not yet been widely translated. And US officials say that while Russia has adjusted its tactics, its forces are generally not getting more sophisticated.

Most of the veteran Russian soldiers died early in the war. Those fighting today, including less trained recently mobilized forces, struggle to conduct offensive operations and coordinate the movements of major military units. And Russian tanks, which have suffered significant losses in 2022, are now often held back from the frontline to be used as a kind of artillery.

“They don’t have enough tanks right now,” Graf said. “They don’t have enough artillery to create a barrage of fire.”

The change in Russian tactics can be seen from both drone surveillance and from the depths of a Ukrainian trench.

Near the eastern Russian-occupied town of Svatove, Ruslan Zubariev, a Ukrainian soldier who goes by the nickname Predator, said the Russians used textbook tactics to break through his line of trenches in February.

“They’ve changed tactics over the past six months,” he said, describing an attack that relied on a degree of strategy on top of brute force.

For four days Russian shelling destroyed the foliage above their heads to reveal Ukrainian positions. Then, he said, they advanced in an armored personnel carrier flanked by about a dozen soldiers.

But as an indication of the limits of tactical improvements, Mr. Zubariev said, the Russians did not have enough information about the locations of the Ukrainian trenches. In the ensuing battle, he captured on video, Mr. Zubariev, 21, almost single-handedly managed to stop the Russian attack.

“They did everything perfectly,” he said. “But something wasn’t working for them. Not enough information, as always.”

Around the eastern city of Kreminna, where Russian troops dug in after being pushed back northeast in September, both sides are taking turns launching small offensive operations in a kind of dance.

“Both sides are trying to prove to the enemy that we will advance now,” Graf said. “And nobody knows for sure who will do it, or where it will be done.”

Around Bakhmut, Ukraine has gained ground in recent days to take significant heights. Russian troops bleed casualties as they try to defend the city that sits in a kind of bowl. Russian troops have turned to former prisoners, a tactic first used by Wagner to dig trenches, according to a recently captured Russian soldier who was a former prisoner.

Russian trenches are often better built than their Ukrainian counterparts, Ukrainian soldiers said. The March mission report said the bunkers were akin to “Vietnam-style spider holes” and “so deep they couldn’t be detected by drones.”

Such defensive positions will pose formidable challenges, a US official said, and it is too early to judge whether Ukraine can overcome them. The Russian defense is layered and despite months of setbacks and losses, has shown determination to keep fighting.

Russia’s air defense remains punitive, as does its ability to jam radios and shoot down drones. As Ukrainian forces advance, troops will be more exposed to Russian air support.

“What will happen next – who the hell knows,” said Mr. Zubariev. “Pay with how many losses – they don’t care.”