Macron and Scholz, Never Close, spar over policy towards Ukraine and Russia

It was a private dinner in a Parisian garden on Boulevard St. Germain, intended to strengthen the important personal relationship between the leaders of France and Germany.

After the meal on July 4, 2022, Chancellor Olaf Scholz said “Merci beaucoup” in a Twitter message praising “close exchanges.” But on the way out, President Emmanuel Macron muttered to a confidante: “This won’t be easy.”

It’s hardly a secret that the two men’s dealings have been anything but easy. Thinly veiled insults between them in recent days have pointed to deeper differences over Ukraine, how to confront and contain an aggressive Russia and how to manage an increasingly polarized United States.

This week, during his visit to Prague, Macron reiterated his refusal to rule out Western troops in Ukraine, a suggestion that surprised his allies who want to avoid a direct confrontation with Russia. Germany in particular withdrew. Mr Macron replied in kind.

“Europe is clearly facing a moment when it will be necessary not to be cowards,” Macron said, a joke that Berlin took as an insult to its post-war history following the Nazi trauma.

German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius responded: “We don’t need, from my perspective at least, discussions about ‘boots on the ground’ or about having more or less courage.”

Since 1945, Franco-German relations have been based on a necessary reconciliation imposed by historical fate. It remains crucial for Europe’s cohesion and its ability to act as a global power. But the bond seems to be faltering in this combustible moment marked by a European war and uncertainty about America’s future commitment to Europe.

There could hardly be a worse time for such alienation in the heart of Europe. Yet, instead of showing unity of purpose and European leadership in their commitment to resist President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, Mr. Macron and Mr. Scholz have begun to bicker over which country is really helping Ukraine the most.

Their latest tensions reflect divergent personal styles and clashing national interests, inspired by domestic politics.

Both men were surprising leaders, even though they came to power in different ways. Mr Macron turned traditional French politics on its head and dreamed of leading a revived Europe, while there was nothing revolutionary about the rise of Mr Scholz, a staunch, stubborn social-democratic lawyer who now leads an uneasy coalition of three parties.

Still, their victories left both with the belief that they are “the smartest person in the room and that they are right when others are wrong,” said Camille Grand, a former French and NATO official who now works at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “Ego is always part of politics, but it makes it more difficult for their partners to operate on the international stage.”

Their responses to Russian aggression have become part of their troubled relationship. Mr Macron spoke in the summer of 2022 about not humiliating Russia and creating a European security order that includes Moscow. He has since changed his mind.

In response to Russian progress in a Ukraine running out of ammunition, and to Russian disinformation aimed at influencing June’s European Parliament elections, Macron is now speaking openly about the danger Moscow poses to Europe, especially as the possibility of another Trump presidency continues to grow. Real.

Mr Macron is comfortable as a provocateur. He sees himself as a disruptor of lazy thinking, evidenced by his suggestion that sending Western troops to Ukraine “should not be ruled out.”

The taboo-breaking comment infuriated Mr. Scholz, who is seen by Mr. Macron as cautious and overly dependent on a United States that is no longer willing to spend large amounts of money on Ukraine.

Mr Macron believes that strict limits on Western military response give Mr Putin effective carte blanche, and he worries that Mr Scholz may not fully understand the importance of Europe’s full commitment to the united defense that is needed is for a years-long confrontation with Moscow.

Mr. Scholz, on the other hand, is wary of direct confrontation with Russia, even though Germany has provided far greater financial and military aid to Ukraine than France. The post-war German aversion to any hint of revived militarism after the Nazi trauma is deep-rooted; The Chancellor’s approach reflects this.

Germany is skeptical of the collective European responses to Russia and believes that European “strategic autonomy” – a favorite expression of Macron – implies too radical an emancipation from Washington.

Mr. Scholz has been less bound by France than by the Biden administration’s caution in confronting a Russian leader who has threatened to use nuclear weapons. Germany has refused to supply Ukraine with long-range missiles that could strike deep into Russia or offer Ukraine accession negotiations to join NATO.

Mr Macron said last month that defeating Russia should be the Western goal, rejecting the preferred German formulation that Russia should not win. For the Germans, his grand statements about the war and his lofty plans for Europe often lack a road map on how to get there.

“Macron’s attempt to create a new sense of urgency is very welcome, but it is not concrete,” said Ulrich Speck, a German analyst. “It does not translate into action, and we see no contingency plan for Europe to deal with the real crisis in Ukraine now.”

An official close to Mr Macron, who requested anonymity in line with French diplomatic protocol, said that while the two leaders may differ on some issues, they still work together every day and are committed to the Franco-German unit.

The ‘French-German couple’ has always been at the center of European decision-making, even though its leaders have often had difficult relations. Former Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany made fun of the gait and gestures of the ebullient Nicolas Sarkozy, a former French president, even though they came together during the 2008 EU financial crisis.

After Mr Macron spoke of NATO’s “brain death” in 2019, she castigated him at the dinner. “I understand your desire for disruptive politics,” Mrs. Merkel said at the time. “But I’m tired of picking up the pieces. Time and time again I have to glue the cups you broke together so that we can sit down together and have a cup of tea.

Mr. Scholz appears to share some of the same weariness with Mr. Macron’s willingness to crack down on China when more political discretion would be appropriate.

Paris has pledged only about 3 percent of the 17.1 billion euros in weapons that Germany promised to Ukraine. But France says it is supplying weapons that could transform the battlefield, such as long-range Scalp cruise missiles, while Germany is reluctant to send its most advanced long-range cruise missile, the Taurus.

After a meeting of European leaders in Paris late last month to discuss Ukraine, Macron ridiculed his allies for refusing to send tanks, fighter jets and long-range missiles to Ukraine, saying they were instead offering “sleeping bags and helmets” from the start . from the war.

The comment was seen as a thinly veiled barb by Mr Scholz. and was doubly resented because France sometimes hesitated about arms supplies. But then Macron went a step further and said the hitherto unspeakable: that it was not impossible to put Western troops on the ground in the war.

Instead of sending Putin a message of new determination and “strategic ambiguity” about how far Western countries would go to defend Ukraine, as Macron wanted, his comments led to an unequivocal rejection from allies including Mr Scholz.

The alliance had agreed “that there would be no ground troops on Ukrainian territory, no soldiers sent there from European states or NATO states,” Scholz said in a direct rebuke to Macron, comments echoed by his colleagues in Poland and Italy. and the Czech Republic.

The next day, Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck, a Green, said sharply: “I am happy that France is thinking about how to increase its support for Ukraine, but if I can give the country one piece of advice: get more weapons.” ”

French officials tried to explain that Macron was talking about Western forces to train Ukrainians, and not combat troops, but the damage had already been done.

Many in Germany saw in Macron’s statements both historical German sensitivities about war and the country’s strategic vulnerability. Germany is not a nuclear power.

“A French president could think about this in a more liberal way than a German chancellor,” said Nils Schmid, a foreign policy spokesman in parliament for Mr Scholz’s Social Democrats. “It would have been better not to open this debate in public because he knew the Chancellor was very much against it – so it was clear that Germany would speak out.”

It was “typical Macron,” said Claudia Major of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. “Good ideas are executed in such a bad way that it destroys the good idea.”

Domestic politics in both countries are not helping as the European Parliament elections approach in June. In his new boldness against Russia, Macron is confronting his main rival parties, the far right and the far left, both of which have expressed pro-Russian sympathies in the past.

By contrast, Mr Scholz, who faces the same European elections and three key state elections this year, has presented himself as the “peace chancellor”, acknowledging that most Germans support Ukraine but fear an escalation of the war.

Since the two countries ended repeated wars in 1945 and joined the European Union, the relationship between France and Germany has always been too great to fail. But it has rarely been more difficult to bring harmony to the band that changed post-war Europe. It may require a new commitment to diplomacy from both leaders.

“This is not the way to behave in this kind of crisis,” Ms Major said.

Steven Erlanger and Erika Solomon reported from Berlin and Roger Cohen from Paris.