Plans for Gaza's 'Day After' seem increasingly distant
As the war in Gaza rages on, there is increasing talk of a “day after” formula for the fractured territory. But that idea is transitory: There will be no clear line between war and peace in Gaza, even if some kind of negotiated solution is reached.
Israel has made clear it will not outsource security along its southern border to anyone else, and Israeli military officials say their forces will continue to move in and out of Gaza based on intelligence, even after the troops eventually withdraw.
“The whole 'the day after' conceit needs to be dropped,” said Aaron David Miller, a former U.S. official at the Carnegie Endowment. “It is misleading and dangerous,” he said, because there will be no clear dividing line “between the end of Israeli military operations and a relative stability that allows people to focus on reconstruction.”
There are all kinds of sketchy ideas – 'plans' would be too specific a word – for what happens in the aftermath of hostilities. But there is a growing realization that any lasting settlement will require a regional agreement involving countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Qatar.
Inevitably, such an agreement must be led by the United States, Israel's most trusted ally. Most officials and analysts assume that new governments are needed, both in Israel and in the Palestinian Authority, which partly governs the West Bank but is considered old and corrupt, indicating the long road ahead .
As a starting point, US special envoy Brett McGurk is touring the region, with his focus on “the potential for a new hostage deal, which would require a humanitarian pause of some length to achieve”, according to a spokesperson for the White House. , John Kirby. Mr. McGurk will be joined in coming days by CIA Director William J. Burns, officials familiar with the talks said.
Mr. McGurk's efforts are complicated and work through Qatar, which sends messages to Hamas leaders. Even with an agreement in principle between Israel and Hamas, the two sides will first have to negotiate a phased exchange of hostages, women and children, for Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons.
Freeing all hostages, including soldiers, would require the controversial release of thousands of Palestinian prisoners, including those convicted of murdering Israelis. Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in Gaza, was one such case, released in a previous prisoner swap in 2011 after 23 years in prison.
Then there is the question from Mr Sinwar and other Hamas leaders: if they are still alive – will they go into exile as part of any settlement? For now, Hamas has rejected the idea.
But an initial hostage deal “is the sine qua non for the administration's larger regional agreement,” said Martin S. Indyk, a former U.S. ambassador to Israel.
That could, U.S. officials hope, open the way for broader negotiations. These include moderate Sunni Arab states that have no great love for Hamas and its main backer, Shiite Iran, and are concerned about Iran's growing power.
While Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel supports efforts for a hostage deal, he is also campaigning for his political survival and has opposed a key pillar of President Biden's broader concept.
Mr. Biden has said he would like to see a “revitalized Palestinian Authority” that would eventually govern Gaza as a stage toward an eventual “two-state solution” — an independent Palestine, largely demilitarized, alongside Israel and committed to a lasting peace.
Mr. Netanyahu portrays himself as the only person who can prevent the Americans from imposing a Palestinian state on a traumatized Israel or imposing significant restrictions on Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank, which is gradually absorbing Palestinian land.
But the Americans believe they can have significant influence on Israel and Netanyahu to make progress. Saudi Arabia, the main regional player, has indicated that it wants to continue the path toward normalization with Israel in return for US security guarantees against Iran, itself a controversial demand.
But Saudi Arabia has said so too that normalization, let alone any cooperation on a post-Gaza future, whether in reconstruction or security assistance, depends on creating an 'irrevocable' process towards a Palestinian state, which Mr Netanyahu rejects.
Netanyahu's vision of a future Gaza is unclear. He continues to insist that Hamas will be “destroyed” and that all hostages will be released. But these objectives appear more contradictory as Israel's military operation in Gaza proceeds slowly and casualties on both sides mount, putting more domestic and international pressure on him.
He has stated what he does not want: Hamas military and political survival in Gaza; the Palestinian Authority gains control of Gaza; any foreign peacekeepers; and an independent Palestinian state. He has denied seeking to reoccupy Gaza long-term, but insisted that Israel would maintain security control over not only Gaza but also the West Bank.
Others have taken positions on either side of Mr. Netanyahu.
His far-right partners, Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir, have proposed expelling Palestinian civilians and resettling Gaza together with Israelis. The idea is considered a non-starter and is signed a specific American reprimand.
Opposition members of the current security cabinet such as Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot, who are seen as popular alternatives to Netanyahu, are more likely to agree to the US idea of a larger regional deal, Indyk said.
This includes Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, who has distanced himself from Mr Netanyahu. All recognize that American support is indispensable for Israel, Mr. Indyk said.
Mr. Gallant, who is a member of Mr. Netanyahu's Likud party, has drawn up his own vague plan. He wants Israel to maintain security control over Gaza, with the army free to come and go as needed. He proposes that Egypt and Israel jointly control the southern Gaza border crossing.
In his vision, there would be no Israeli civilian presence in Gaza, while the civilian administration would be led by Palestinians with foreign control, but not by the Palestinian Authority.
Mr. Gallant's plan is thought to be similar to what Mr. Netanyahu thinks privately. But Mr. Gallant also partly reflects the Israeli military's vision, says Nahum Barnea, a well-connected columnist at the popular daily Yediot Ahronoth.
“The vision is not a victory,” he said, but a managed, intermittent conflict without a major permanent Israeli presence.
The military would like to turn Gaza into something similar to the situation in the restive, unstable cities of the northern West Bank, such as Nablus and Jenin, where it goes where it wants. In Gaza, the intention is to operate from a buffer zone within Gaza, which is now being established, and to go deeper into the territory from time to time for specific operations.
The army, Barnea said, “is not looking for Somalia, but for Nablus.”
No one thinks a quick deal is possible. Training some 6,000 Palestinian security forces to control Gaza, even in coordination with some multinational Arab force, would take as long as 10 months, according to U.S. officials.
In the meantime, they hope that Arab countries, and possibly Turkey, heir to Gaza's Ottoman rulers, would agree to control Gaza. That is a very questionable goal, given the political sensitivity of Muslim countries that monitor Palestinians partly on behalf of Israeli security.
So there is no shortcut to an “RPA,” the Biden administration's latest acronym for a “revitalized Palestinian Authority.” At a minimum, it would require the retirement or “emeritus” status of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, internal reforms and some form of Palestinian elections, senior US officials say.
The last elections took place in 2006, and new ones would almost certainly result in a political role for Hamas. And in the meantime, there should be an interim administration in Gaza, made up of Palestinian notables or technocrats, they say.
The Palestinians themselves are not ready for it. “To put it bluntly, there is a complete disconnect between the international community's call for a two-state solution and the willingness of Israelis and Palestinians to now consider this as a viable way to end their conflict,” Mr. Indyk said.
Still, he said, Washington must “seek to create a new, more stable order in Gaza, and that cannot be done without also creating a credible political horizon that ultimately leads to a two-state solution.”
Despite the enormous task ahead of U.S. diplomacy, time is limited — likely only until September, officials say — and that could create pressure to act. Mr Netanyahu is aware that Mr Biden will be re-elected in November and may want to see what happens in the US elections.
The Arab interlocutors are also well aware that unless a deal is reached in the fall, they may have to deal with the lame duck, Mr. Biden, and in anticipation of the unpredictable Donald J. Trump. Even senior US officials think the best chance for a deal is if Biden is re-elected, a senior Western diplomat admitted.
Yaakov Amidror, a former general and national security adviser, said he sees 2024 as a year of low-intensity warfare. The next year or 18 months will be devoted to finding and destroying Hamas tunnels, infrastructure and fighters, said Mr. Amidror, now a fellow at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies, a conservative think tank.
He believes that eventually, by mid-2025, Hamas will no longer have the military and political capacity to govern Gaza. And the Israeli military could be in a position to operate in Gaza following the West Bank model, he said.
So even with good intentions, there is a long way to go to a true 'day after', and there are many possible ways for the best laid plans to go awry. Chief among them, despite all American efforts, could be if war breaks out between Israel and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, which could make the destruction in Gaza seem like just a prologue.
Reporting was contributed by Patrick Kingsley, Gal Koplewitz and Aaron Boxerman in Jerusalem and Vivian Nereim in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.