Terrible choices and deep distrust: the path to the hostage situation

Ultimately, the deal to release some of the hostages held by Hamas came down to two critical phone calls, ultimately forcing both sides to make a tough concession.

The Israelis insisted that freeing just 50 of the approximately 240 hostages was not enough. They had to have more, they said. At that point, President Biden had to persuade Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel to accept what was on the table, and then keep working to get the rest back.

As for Hamas, according to senior government officials, its leaders demanded that the pause in fighting be included in the five-day agreement, even though the Israelis refused to agree to more than four days. Mr Biden told Qatar’s emir, who served as a go-between for Hamas, that they would only get four for now.

The road to the hostage deal was painful and arduous, marked by inconsistent progress, deep mistrust, terrible choices, and moments when the whole thing was on the verge of falling apart. Neither side got exactly what they wanted. But if the deal is successfully implemented in the coming days – and that is still a key condition – it could serve as a template for further negotiations to free more hostages and extend the temporary ceasefire.

“Last night’s deal is a testament to the tireless diplomacy and determination of many dedicated individuals in the U.S. government to bring Americans home,” Mr. Biden said. said on X on Wednesday, the platform formerly called Twitter. “Now it is important that all aspects are fully implemented.”

This story is based on senior Biden administration officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity to avoid disrupting communications channels.

Efforts to free the hostages date back to the hours after the October 7 terrorist attack, when Hamas gunmen killed about 1,200 people and captured the other 240.

Shortly after the attack, the government of Qatar, a small Gulf emirate that hosts some Hamas leaders but has close ties with the United States, approached the White House with information about the hostages and raised the possibility of a deal to secure their release . The Qataris asked that a small group of American officials work secretly with them and the Israelis.

Jake Sullivan, the president’s national security adviser, assigned Brett McGurk, the White House Middle East coordinator, and Joshua Geltzer, then the deputy homeland security adviser who has since become the National Security Council’s top lawyer, to take the lead. To maintain secrecy, other agencies remained in the dark about the initiative.

Mr McGurk, who has wide contacts in the region, held early morning phone calls every day with Qatar’s emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, and then briefed Mr Sullivan, who kept Mr Biden informed. Mr. Sullivan kept in touch with Ron Dermer and Tzachi Hanegbi, two of Mr. Netanyahu’s closest advisers.

The issue was personal for Mr. Biden, who met with families of Americans believed to be among the hostages on Oct. 13 on a Zoom call. Mr. Biden extended the scheduled time for the conversation so that every family would have a chance to talk about their missing loved ones. Administration officials who were in the Oval Office or on the line described it as one of the most painful moments of Biden’s presidency.

On October 23, White House negotiations with Qatar led to the release of two American citizens, Natalie and Judith Raanan, with Mr. Sullivan, Mr. McGurk and Jon Finer, the deputy national security adviser, following what turned out to be an isolated incident. multi-hour journey from Gaza in real time from the West Wing. Their release encouraged Mr Biden and his team to believe the Qatar channel could lead to the release of more hostages.

The Israelis delegated authority to negotiate to David Barnea, the director of Mossad, the Israeli spy agency. Mr. Barnea began talking regularly with William J. Burns, the director of the CIA, about the contours of a deal. Mr Biden spoke with Mr Netanyahu on October 20, 22, 23 and 25, with the hostages being a key topic of the conversation each time.

Hamas was told by the Americans on October 25 that it had agreed to the parameters of an agreement to release the women and children among the hostages as long as there was a delay in a planned Israeli ground invasion of Gaza. But the Israelis felt the deal was not strong enough to stop the invasion. Among other things, Hamas had not provided any evidence that the hostages were still alive.

But the Israelis have adjusted their ground invasion to take place in phases, allowing the fighting to be paused if a deal is reached, U.S. officials said. Over the next three weeks, as Israeli forces entered Gaza, negotiations with Qatar and Egypt continued.

At one point after Mr. McGurk was on the phone with Qatar’s prime minister, Mr. Biden insisted he wanted to talk to the emir himself. The call, which was not publicly announced, helped shape a deal brokered to free women and children in the first phase, as part of what would be several stages of releases in exchange for the release of Palestinians held by the Israelis were held captive.

The Israelis insisted that the first release would include all women and children and demanded proof of life or identifying information. Hamas responded by saying it could guarantee that 50 hostages would be released in the first phase, but declined to provide a list or even the criteria it used to determine who would be released. On Nov. 9, Mr. Burns met in Doha, the capital of Qatar, with Sheikh Tamim, the emir, and Mr. Barnea, the head of Mossad, to review the texts of the emerging settlement.

Mr. Biden called Sheikh Tamim three days later and said “enough was enough,” according to U.S. officials. The Americans and Israelis needed the names or clear identification of the fifty hostages who were to be released. Without that, Mr. Biden told the emir, there was no basis for moving forward. Shortly afterwards, Hamas came up with identifying criteria for the fifty, although the Israelis and Americans believed the criteria would include more than just fifty.

Mr. Sullivan met at the White House the next day with families of Americans held hostage to assure them that every effort was being made to secure their freedom.

A day later, Mr. Biden spoke with Mr. Netanyahu, who was still pushing for more than 50 hostages. The president urged him to accept the deal and they would continue to work together to release the remainder in future phases. The prime minister eventually agreed, and Mr. Dermer, his adviser, later called Mr. Sullivan to outline the formula the Israeli War Cabinet preferred.

Mr McGurk saw Mr Netanyahu in Israel that same day. As he left a difficult meeting, the Prime Minister grabbed Mr McGurk’s arm. “We need this deal,” Mr. Netanyahu said, pleading with Mr. McGurk to let the president call Sheikh Tamim about the final terms.

Hours later, as the deal appeared to be closing, the talks were abruptly halted when communications in Gaza broke down and there was no connection to Hamas. Once communications were restored, Hamas broke off the talks, citing the Israeli attack on Gaza’s Al-Shifa hospital, a location that Israelis and Americans say is being used by Hamas as a military outpost. Hamas insisted that Israeli forces leave the hospital without searching the grounds. Israel refused, but said it would keep the hospital running.

Then the conversations resumed. Mr Biden, who was in San Francisco for unrelated meetings with Asia-Pacific leaders, called Sheikh Tamim on Friday and told him this was the last chance and that “time was running out,” as one US official put it expressed. Hamas wanted a five-day break in the fighting, but the president told him that Israel would accept only four and that Hamas would have to bow to that.

Mr McGurk, who listened in on the call from the Middle East, met with Sheikh Tamim in Doha the next day to review the text of the deal. They contacted Mr. Burns by phone after he spoke to Mossad. The six-page deal initially provided for women and children to come out, including three Americans, but anticipated future releases. The emir relayed the proposal to Hamas late that evening.

The next morning, Mr. McGurk was meeting in Cairo with Abbas Kamel, the head of Egypt’s intelligence service, when an American aide delivered a message from Hamas leaders accepting almost all the terms. Over the next few days the final details were worked out. On Tuesday morning, Hamas informed Qatar that it had approved the deal. The Israeli government met for seven hours that evening and also signed off.

“Today’s deal should bring home additional American hostages,” Biden said on the East Coast shortly before midnight Tuesday, “and I will not stop until they are all freed.”