Where was the Israeli army?

The Israeli government had determined that the loosely organized vigilante group known as Kitat Konnenut would serve as the first line of defense in the towns and villages near the border. But the guards had different training standards depending on who was in charge. For years, they warned that some of their units were poorly trained and inadequately equipped, according to two Israeli military officials with direct knowledge of the volunteer teams.

Furthermore, Israeli military reservists were unwilling to mobilize and deploy quickly. Some described going south on their own initiative.

Davidi Ben Zion, 38, a major in the reserves, said reservists have never been trained to respond to an invasion at a moment’s notice. The training assumed that Israeli intelligence would be aware of an impending invasion in advance, giving reservists time to prepare for deployment.

“As per procedure, we will have the battalion ready for battle within 24 hours,” he said. “There is a checklist to authorize the distribution of everything. We have practiced that for years.”

Hamas took advantage of these mistakes in a way that further delayed the Israeli response. Terrorists blocked key highway intersections, leaving soldiers bogged down in gun battles as they tried to enter besieged cities. And the Hamas siege of the military base in southern Israel paralyzed the regional command post, crippling the military response.

Much remains unknown about that day, including what orders were given within Israel’s senior military leadership in Tel Aviv, and when. The Times investigation builds on and adds new details to the Israeli media’s aggressive reporting of the military response.

Officers and reservists heading south that morning, either on orders or on their own, soon learned of the chaos they were entering.

General Barak Hiram, who would soon take command of a division along the Gaza border, drove south to see firsthand how soldiers there responded to what appeared to be a routine Hamas attack.

In an interview, he recalled text messages he received from soldiers he knew in the region.

“Come save us.”

“Send the army quickly, they will kill us.”

“Sorry to turn to you, we’re already out of weapons.”

Unprepared for battle

Commando units were among the first to mobilize that morning. Some said they joined the fight after receiving messages pleading for help or learning about the infiltrations through social media.

Other units were on standby and received formal activation orders.

The small size of the teams suggested that commanders fundamentally misunderstood the threat. Troops rolled out with pistols and assault rifles, enough to deal with a gang of hostage terrorists, but not to engage in a full-scale battle.

Previously undisclosed documents reviewed by The Times show how drastically the military misread the situation. Evidence from early in the day shows that even during the attack, the army still believed that Hamas would, at best, be able to breach Israel’s border fence in only a few places. A separate intelligence document prepared weeks later shows that Hamas teams actually breached the fence at more than 30 locations and quickly moved deep into southern Israel.

Hamas fighters poured into Israel with heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, land mines and more. They were prepared to fight for days. Israeli commandos apparently thought they would fight for only a few hours; someone said he left that morning without his night vision goggles.

“The terrorists had a clear tactical advantage in terms of firepower,” said Yair Ansbacher, 40, a reservist in a counterterrorism unit who fought on Oct. 7. He and his colleagues primarily used pistols, assault rifles and sometimes sniper rifles, he said.

The situation was so dire that at 9 a.m. the head of Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security service, issued a rare order. He told all combat-trained, gun-toting personnel to head south. Shin Bet is not normally activated in the military. Ten Shin Bet operatives were killed that day.

Making matters worse, the army has acknowledged that it moved two commando companies – more than a hundred soldiers – to the West Bank just two days before the attack, reflecting Israel’s misperception that a Hamas attack did not pose an imminent threat .

Three infantry battalions and one tank battalion remained along the Gaza border. But October 7 was the Jewish holiday of Simchat Torah and the Sabbath. A senior military officer estimated that about half of the 1,500 soldiers in the area were gone. He said another infantry battalion had been reassigned years earlier after Israel finished building a security wall around Gaza.

Whether Hamas knew the army was understaffed is unclear, but it had fatal consequences. When the attacks began, many soldiers were fighting for their lives instead of protecting nearby residents. Hamas stormed one base, Nahal Oz, forcing soldiers to abandon it and leave behind dead friends.

And just as the civilian volunteers had warned, the first line of defense within Israel was quickly overwhelmed. Some units barely had enough weapons to sustain an hours-long battle, officials said.

Hamas also worked strategically to weaken Israel’s advantage in firepower. Terrorists targeted Israeli tanks, hitting several, Brigadier General said. General Hisham Ibrahim, the commander of the armored corps. The tanks ran out of ammunition, forcing the crews to fight with ground soldiers.

In another case widely reported in the Israeli mediaHamas shot at an Israeli helicopter, downing it near Gaza. The paratroopers escaped injury before the helicopter caught fire.

All this should have been a clear sign that Israel was under broad attack and faced with a dire situation.

But Hamas launched another strategic attack that morning, virtually blinding the Israeli army at a critical moment.